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Abstract
In this paper, we will investigate the re-emergence of Confucianism in contemporary Chi-
na as a complex intersection of political, cultural, educational and popular perspectives. 
This resurgence is neither a kind of Chinese Neoclassicism nor a nostalgic backwardness, 
instead it is the emblem of the new China’s identity. Confucius and Confucianism, vio-
lently despised as the remains of feudalism since the May Fourth Movement and during 
Maoism, are nowadays a fertile source for the fulfilment of “Socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics” (zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi 中国特色社会主义) on both the educational and 
political levels. We carry out the investigation in three steps: 1. The political rehabilitation 
of Confucianism as part of the “Chinese dream” (zhongguo meng 中国梦); 2. The common 
social perception of Confucianism and tradition as a shared and unavoidable background; 
3. The definition of two possible Confucianisms (namely New Confucianism and Politi-
cal Confucianism) and their possible influences on Chinese society and moral education. 
Our conclusions will deal with Chinese cultural soft power, and the shaping of a new 
Confucian identity based on both modernity and tradition.
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Moralna izobrazba in ideologija: preporod konfucianističnih vrednot in har-
monično oblikovanje novega kitajskega človeka
Izvleček
V tem članku bomo raziskovali ponovno pojavljanje konfucianizma v sodobni Kitajski 
kot kompleksnem križišču političnih, kulturnih, izobraževalnih in popularnih perspektiv. 
Tovrstno oživljanje ni vrsta novega kitajskega neoklasicizma ne nostalgično pogledovanje 
nazaj, ampak predstavlja simbol nove kitajske identitete. Konfucij in konfucianizem, ki so 
ju na silo prezirali kot ostanek fevdalizma vse od Gibanja četrtega maja in tudi med mao-
izmom, sta danes plodna vira za izpopolnjevanje »socializma s kitajskimi značilnostmi« 
(zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi 中国特色社会主义), tako na izobraževalni kot na politični 
ravni. Raziskavo izvajamo v teh korakih: 1. Politična rehabilitacija konfucianizma kot del 
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»kitajskih sanj« (zhongguo meng 中国梦); 2. Skupno družbeno dojemanje konfucianizma 
in tradicije kot skupno in neizogibno ozadje; 3. Definicije dveh mogočih konfucianizmov 
(t. i. novi konfucianizem in politični konfucianizem) in novih mogočih vplivov na kitajsko 
družbo in moralno izobrazbo. Zaključki se ukvarjajo s kitajsko »mehko močjo« in oblik-
ovanjem nove kitajske identitete, ki temeljita na modernosti in tradiciji.
Ključne besede: politični konfucianizem, novi konfucianizem, kitajske sanje, moralna 
izobrazba
Politics and the Confucian Chinese Dream
On February 7, 2014, President Xi Jinping, commenting on the decisions of the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, explained that a 
new “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi 中国特
色社会主义) meant a complete revival or rejuvenation (fuxing 复兴) of Chinese 
society and policy through traditional culture. He stated that:
since the introduction of the reform and opening-up policy some three 
decades ago, our Party has begun to ponder the issue of the national 
governance system from a new perspective, […]. Today, we are tasked 
with an important historic mission, that is to make our socialist system 
with Chinese characteristics more mature and better established, and 
provide a more complete, more stable and more effective system for the 
development of the Party and the nation, the well-being of the people, 
social harmony and stability, and the enduring prosperity and stability of 
the country. Our governance system will become more efficient as long 
as we focus on improving the Party’s governance capacity while raising 
the moral and political standards, scientific and cultural levels, and the 
professional abilities of officials […]. The kind of governance system best 
suited for a country is determined by that country’s historical heritage 
and cultural traditions and its level of social and economic development, 
and it is ultimately decided by that country’s people. Our current na-
tional governance system has been developed and gradually improved 
over a long period of time on the basis of our storied heritage, cultural 
traditions, and social and economic development. […] A nation’s culture 
is a unique feature that distinguishes that nation from others. We should 
delve deeper into and better elucidate China’s excellent traditional cul-
ture, and make greater efforts to creatively transform and develop tradi-
tional Chinese virtues, promoting a cultural spirit that transcends time 
and national boundaries, and has eternal attraction and contemporary 
Azijske_studije_2017_2_FINAL.indd   114 4.7.2017   10:06:13
115Asian Studies V (XXI), 2 (2017), pp. 113–135
value. […] As long as the Chinese people pursue lofty virtues generation 
after generation our nation will be forever filled with hope. (Xi 2014a).
Xi Jinping always praises China’s last thirty-five years of extraordinary develop-
ment, which started when Deng Xiaoping proposed the opening of the Chinese 
economy and society to the world market. According to Xi and all the other 
Presidents since Deng, this was the only possible way of achieving policy reforms, 
economic growth and a better quality of life for all Chinese people. Xi openly 
stated that while in the 1980s and 1990s the priority was opening of free markets 
along with industrial and financial growth, in recent years the new focus has been 
on the shaping of a fair society, with this being achieved by: promoting culture 
and values, the only two weapons that can safeguard long-term growth and fight 
corruption. The term culture here refers to the traditional culture of Chinese his-
tory, the same tradition that was rejected by the leading thinkers of the May Forth 
Movement, as well as the founder of the Communist Party, Chen Duxiu. In 1916, 
Chen Duxiu contrasted the new ideology of independence (duli zhuyi 独立主
义) with Confucian values, and the latter were described as completely outdated 
and repressive, while independence was the condition of a modern economy and 
growth. Confucianism was thus seen as preventing the improvement of Chinese 
society. Further, Chen Duxiu (1916) declared that Confucius lived in a “feudal 
epoch”, and therefore he provided only a feudalistic moral way (fengjian shidai zhi 
daode 封建时代之道德). This opinion of the founder of the Chinese Communist 
Party was shared by Mao, who used the term “feudalism” (fengjian 封建) as a label 
to use against enemies of the socialist project. However, the use of the terms “feu-
dal” and “feudalism” is obviously only ideological, since in Chinese history they 
apply only to the Western Zhou (1066–771 BC). The correct meaning of the term 
fengjian 封建 is the decentralised system of government that was used during the 
Zhou dynasty. In the early 20th century, this same term was applied to mean the 
“Chinese empire” in order to fit into the Marxist social stages of development. As 
such, how could it be that Xi Jinping, and before him Hu Jintao, were so clearly 
working to recover the Chinese tradition of Confucianism, which is nowadays 
often improperly labelled as “feudalistic”? 
We can find a clear answer to this question in Hu Jintao’s speech at the 90th 
Anniversary of the founding of CPC on July 1, 2011. Hu devoted part of his long 
speech to an outline of the last two centuries of Chinese history and, without 
plainly disavowing the fact that imperialistic China was “feudalistic”, he attrib-
uted the reasons for these “feudalistic” conditions to the Opium Wars and the 
arrogance of foreign powers, reshaping the Marxist concept as it had been applied 
to China. This external corruption caused the ruin of Chinese civilisation, the 
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suffering of the Chinese poor, and the development of corruption. At that time, 
using Hu’s words, “China gradually became a semi-colony and semi-feudalistic 
society (zhongguo zhubu chengwei ban zhimindi ban fengjian shehui 中国逐步成为
半殖民地半封建社会)” (Hu 2011). To fight this imported corruption was thus 
the primary mission of the Communist Party, and it worked on this aim until the 
complete defeat of Japanese Imperialism and the “reactionaries” of the Guomin-
dang in 1949. According to Hu, what followed was the creation of a socialist so-
ciety under Mao, but the real success was the third phase, when China undertook 
the process of reform and economic opening with Deng Xiaoping, finally creating 
a socialistic society with Chinese characteristics. This is a Chinese Socialism that 
needs, in order to be truly Chinese, not only economic growth but, first of all, 
Chinese culture, literature, tradition and wisdom, which are no longer seen as 
“feudalistic relics”. 
This is the reason why Xi Jinping set out the idea of the “Chinese dream” (zhong-
guo meng 中国梦) as the goal of his mandate, a dream of prosperity and harmony 
that necessarily needs Chinese traditions, values and the close study of ancient 
texts. In a speech on October 21, 2013, the Chinese President gave example of 
some exemplary students: Confucius, Sun Jing, Su Qin, Kuang Heng, Chen Yi 
and Sun Kang, the six leading figures of classical Chinese Confucianism, and 
even quoted Mozi’s “exaltation of the virtuous is fundamental to governance” (Xi 
2013a). Again, on June 6, 2014, while speaking to Overseas Chinese Associations, 
he highlighted the role of culture and tradition as the common link among all 
Chinese, and therefore as the real Chinese identity, which is shared, we can guess, 
even by those who left China before 1949. Here, Xi said: 
For Chinese people both at home and abroad, a united Chinese nation 
is our shared root, the profound Chinese culture is our shared soul, and 
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is our shared dream. […] Chinese 
civilization, with a history going back more than 5,000 years, provides 
strong intellectual support for the country’s ceaseless self-improvement 
and growth. No matter where a Chinese is, he always bears the distinc-
tive brand of the Chinese culture, which is the common heritage of all 
the sons and daughters of China. I hope all Chinese will continue to car-
ry forward Chinese culture and draw strength from it, while promoting 
exchanges between Chinese civilizations and other civilizations. Let us 
tell the stories of China well, and make our voices heard […] (Xi 2014b)
In this excerpt from Xi’s speech, Chinese tradition is presented not only as Chi-
nese heritage, as the links among a dispersed and fragmented civilisation, but also 
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as a universal philosophy, able to attract people from different countries and civili-
sations. As such, all other civilisations have to respect and take into consideration 
this thousands-year old tradition, full of wisdom and moral probity. Therefore, 
both within and outside China, tradition was set up the central tenet of the new 
policy. Within the country it provides the backbone of society and the means 
for the process of moralisation at all levels, while outside it is the presentable 
and attractive face of the nation, which grants stable international relationships 
and equal cultural exchanges. Tradition is thus the emblem of China’s soft power 
(Scarpari 2015), as Xi Jinping noted on December 30, 2013:
The strengthening of our cultural soft power is decisive for China to 
reach the Two Centenary Goals and realize the Chinese dream of rejuve-
nation of the Chinese nation. […] To strengthen our cultural soft power, 
we should disseminate the values of modern China. During its 5,000-
year history, the Chinese nation has created a brilliant and profound cul-
ture. We should disseminate the most fundamental Chinese culture in a 
popular way to attract more people to participate in it, matching modern 
culture and society. We should popularize our cultural spirit across coun-
tries as well as across time and space, with contemporary values and the 
eternal charm of Chinese culture, which feature both excellent tradition 
and modern spirit, both nationally and internationally. (Xi 2013b)
We thus see, at least in these Presidents’ speeches, the growing interest in Chinese 
tradition within the political elite, and as a real asset of Chinese policy. Chinese 
Presidents clearly understood that in order to compete with the USA and Europe, 
the country needs not only a strong economy and stable market, but also compet-
itive scientific culture and broad cultural appeal. The “Chinese dream” thus needs 
to look backward in order to look forwards. 
Confucianism as a Contemporary Social Asset 
Now we should try to understand whether this use of traditional culture was just 
a political campaign led by the last two Presidents, or instead the expression of a 
mass phenomenon already rooted in society. The answer is not simple, but we can 
simply say that in this regard the Communist Party is meeting a social demand for 
the rehabilitation of tradition, since traditional culture––despite almost a century 
of condemnation––never really disappeared among the common people. We can 
find support for this incontrovertible fact in several ways, and one of the best is to 
consult a few recent surveys on social perceptions of cultural values.
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Between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2014, the website zhongguo zhengzhi 
zuobiaoxi 中国政治坐标系 (The Chinese Political Compass) conducted a large 
survey with fifty questions, which included items on national and international 
politics, micro and macro-economy, security, culture and society. Over those two 
years there were more than 460,000 online responses, with the possible answers to 
the related statements being: strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree. 
Of the fifty questions, the following five are of great interest to our investigation: 
42. “One should not openly comment on the shortcomings of our elders” (bu ying 
kai tanlun ziji zhangbei de quedian 不应公开谈论自己长辈的缺点); 43. “Modern 
Chinese society needs Confucianism” (xiandai zhongguo shehui xuyao rujia sixiang 
现代中国社会需要儒家思想); 46. “The eight diagrams of The Book of Changes 
can explain many facts” (zhouyi bagua nengguo youxiao de jieshi henduo shiqing 周
易八卦能够有效的解释很多事情); 47. “The perspective of traditional Chinese 
medicine on human health is superior to that of modern mainstream medical 
science” (zhongguo chuantong yixue dui renti jiankang de guannian bi xiandai zhu-
liu yixue geng gaoming 中国传统医学对人体健康的观念比现代主流医学更高
明); 49. “Traditional Chinese classics should be the basic education material for 
children” (yingdang zhongguo chanting wenhua de jingdian zuopin wei ertong jichu 
jiaoyu duwu 应当将中国传统文化的经典作品为儿童基础教育读物). 
Question n. 42 raises the central tenet of Chinese traditional society as based 
on social rites (li 礼), namely xiao 孝, that is usually translated in English as 
filial piety and states the unconditional love and respect of children for their par-
ents. In the Analects 4.18 Confucius says: “In serving your father and mother, 
remonstrate with them gently. On seeing that they do not heed your suggestions, 
remain respectful and do not act contrary. Although concerned, voice no resent-
ment” (Ames and Rosemont 1998), 子曰：「事父母幾諫。見志不從，又敬不
違，勞而不怨。」. Confucius is thus suggesting that children should never act 
against their parents, even if they seem to be at fault. The Chinese respondents 
were almost equally divided, with 7.3% strongly disagreed, 38% disagreed, 34.8% 
agreed and 19.9% strongly agreed. In short, 45.3% of them disagreed while 54.7% 
agreed, suggesting the endurance of classical Chinese social values even among 
internet users aged mostly between 18 and 30.
On the relevance of Confucianism (n. 43), the vast majority disagreed (73.4%), 
however this negative answer is counterintuitive, since filial piety, rituals, and et-
iquette are the core of Confucian thought. Therefore, according to this survey, 
Confucianism in China still suffers from a negative image, but as an institution 
of power and not as a social norm or form education. We will return to this point 
later (see 4. Conclusions). 
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Question n. 46 is about one of the most famous books of Chinese wisdom, The 
Book of Changes (Yijing 易经 or Zhou Yi 周易). The eight diagrams are the base 
of the sixty-four hexagrams that are used to predict and explain events, and to 
understand the deep nature of each person. These diagrams were seen as ineffec-
tive by 47.7% of the respondents, while effective for 52.3% of them. Again, as for 
filial piety, for this item a slight majority of the respondents seemed to defend 
traditional culture.
However, the most surprising data are related to the last two questions. Ques-
tion n. 47, on the validity of Chinese medicine, received 64.3% positive answers, 
indicating that most respondents felt that this approach to the human body and 
health was superior to modern, mainstream medicine. Similarly, 62.1% of the 
respondents agreed with the use of Chinese classics as core texts for children in 
school (n. 49), or to be more accurate only 3.9% strongly disagreed, 33.9% disa-
greed, 51.2% agreed and 10.9% strongly agreed. 经典 (Classics) is a general term 
meaning many different ancient works, but among them we could mention the 
Five Classics (wujing 五经), namely The Book of Documents (Shujing 书经), The 
Book of Poetry (Shijing 诗经), The Classics of Rites (Liji 礼记), The Book of Changes 
(Yijing 易经), The Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋) and, the four Con-
fucian Books (sishu 四书), including The Analects (Lunyu 论语) by Confucius and 
Mencius (Mengzi 孟子). In our opinion, comparing the answers to questions n. 43 
and n. 49 we find a clear incongruity, since Confucianism was seen as unneces-
sary for a large majority of the respondents, but the Classics, which were largely 
shaped and influenced by Confucianism (sishu wujing 四书五经), are suitable as 
a basis for children’s education. We thus suggest that Confucianism as a political 
institution is being rejected, while Confucianism as a moral practice and as a so-
cial regulator is still appreciated by a large number of Chinese people.
S. Billioud and J. Thoraval (2014), have recently shown that since the year 2000 a 
clear Confucian renewal has taken place in three areas: 1. In education, with the 
creation of the Confucian scholastic academies (sishu 私塾); 2. In the religious 
or spiritual area, with the growing relevance of traditional ritualism, with rites of 
passage and celebrations in honour of Confucius, particularly in his hometown 
Qufu; and 3. Confucianism as moral path or rendao 人道 for all Chinese people. 
The two authors, at the end of their comprehensive investigation, suggest that we 
are facing two kinds of Confucianism: a popular one, active in Chinese villages 
and among humble people living traditional rural lives; and an elitist one, in order 
to educate a new political class. We clearly see the double concern of modern 
Confucianism here: the growth of popular consent, and the active role of a new 
elite in the socio-political future of the country. In this context tradition is not 
to be seen as something confined to isolated rural backwardness, but rather the 
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future of one of the most powerful nations in the world. As we have seen in previ-
ous paragraphs, Chinese traditions and Confucianism are the core of the “Chinese 
dream” launched by Xi Jinping.
Connected with the issues of “popular Confucianism” and a “Confucian elite”, Shi 
Tianjian (2015) suggests, through the use of several thorough surveys, that we 
can find two kinds of democratic orientations among modern Chinese people: 
1. Idiocentric, namely a policy theory centred on individuals; and 2. Allocentric, 
where social relationships, communitarian life and relational values are the real 
core. The allocentric democratic orientation is very diffused in China, and traces 
its origins back to Confucius himself, as, in The Analects 2.3 he teaches: “Lead 
the people with administrative injunctions and keep them orderly with penal law, 
and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame (chi 恥). 
Lead them with moral excellence and keep them orderly through observing ritual 
propriety and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order them-
selves” (Ames and Rosemont 1998), 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而
無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」. Confucius thus bases his system 
on the sense of shame (chi 恥/耻), and so the social burden of admonition and 
punishment is displaced from a central governmental authority to society itself, 
and particularly to the family. This leads to a collective society where the allocen-
tric orientation is more natural, while the idiocentric is in complete contrast with 
tradition and culture, perceived as an imported Western ideology, mostly diffused 
in large cities and coastal provinces––as the study by J. Pan and Xu Yiqing (2015) 
has also shown about the diffusion of more liberal ideas. 
Contemporary China is searching for its “Chinese socialist way” within a renovat-
ed “allocentric” orientation that has Confucianism as driver and champion. How-
ever, this rich vein of morality and wisdom is not univocal, since in the last century 
Confucianism underwent several important changes and alterations. Therefore, 
we have to try to investigate which Confucianism can be dreamt within the “Chi-
nese dream” (zhongguo meng 中国梦), and which can be proposed as the basis of 
a new “Confucian education”.
The Two Approaches to Confucianism: Political or Personal Education?
In 1911 the Chinese Empire collapsed together with all the institutions based 
on Confucian tradition: the Imperial Examinations (which had already ended in 
1905), the Imperial Hanlin Academy, the rituals performed by the Imperial Court, 
the temples and so on. The May Fourth Movement and the Communist party 
fought against any traces of Confucianism and other traditional values. However, 
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within the recently founded Chinese universities, traditional values found strong 
supporters in the fields of philosophy and classical studies. When the Communist 
Republic was established 1949, the majority of intellectuals left China for Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and even western countries, such as the USA, the UK, or France. 
New Confucianism
Among those intellectuals there was the philosophical school of New Confucian-
ism, with Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi as leading thinkers. New 
Confucianism xinrujia 新儒家 is not a recent phenomenon: rather it is rooted 
in the thought of the Song Dynasty (960–1279), when Confucian thinkers, in-
fluenced by the Buddhist universal metaphysics of the “Buddha nature” foxing 佛
性 in all men, started to present good human nature shanxing 善性 as universal 
and common to all beings. Therefore, since this time Confucian philosophy has 
shown more abstract and metaphysical concerns as compared with the practi-
cal political interests of Confucius or Mencius. Obviously, “practical or politi-
cal Confucianism” never disappeared from Chinese society, Confucianism being 
the institutional foundations of the Imperial system. However, when in 1911 the 
Empire collapsed, Institutional Confucianism lost not only Imperial support, but 
also its reason for being. That is why, even in Taiwan or Hong Kong, where the 
societies guarded its traditional aspects, Institutional Confucianism often lost its 
place to the metaphysical New Confucian philosophy that bloomed in the 1960s 
and 1970s, particularly within the international cross-cultural academic milieu. 
But we now need to bear in mind that in the mid-19th century, when the military 
and economic power of the Empire showed all its weaknesses in the Opium Wars 
and the Taiping Revolution, a four-character expression circulated among learned 
Chinese men: zhong ti xi yong 中体西用, which we can translate as “Chinese 
[culture] is essence, while Western [knowledge or science] is function”. The idea 
was that Western military capacity and scientific knowledge were indisputably 
superior to those of the Chinese, but these abilities were only devoted to practical 
ends, and the continuous evolution of techniques and knowledge within China 
would make this superiority unstable and temporary. On the opposite side, Chi-
nese traditional wisdom of self-cultivation and moral norms were the unchangea-
ble structure of society, and went straight to the core of an unalterable human na-
ture. The author who diffused this sentence was the eminent Qing official Zhang 
Zhidong, who explained, in his Exhortation to Study (Quanxue pian 劝学篇), the 
necessity of both science and morality (Zhang 1998). The Confucian reformers 
of the last decades of the Qing Empire, such as Kang Youwei, tried to use this 
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concept of “Chinese culture as structure” (zhong ti 中体) as a basis for the reform 
of Chinese society, but their attempt failed, being repressed by court conservatism. 
After 1911 this programmatic proposition was gradually dismissed and lost its 
social appeal under the attack of both modernism and New Confucianism.
As we said above, Confucianism survived as a system of thought among those 
philosophers who mostly belonged to the school of Modern New Confucianism 
xiandai xinrujia 现代新儒家. Those thinkers were not backward traditionalists, 
but rather philosophers fully aware of Western philosophical thought who strug-
gled to find and claim a place for Chinese thought within World Philosophy. 
They refused the zhong ti xi yong 中体西用 theory (Chinese culture as essence 
and Western as function), since they were trying to insert Chinese philosophy in 
a direct dialogue with other philosophies, and this was incompatible with the pre-
sumed superiority of Chinese wisdom. But at the same time, they were refusing 
the Western theory of Chinese intrinsic inferiority as advocated within the Hege-
lian, Positivist or Weberian schools. Their proposed systems of thought––we can-
not investigate these in detail in this article––were refined adaptations of Chinese 
thought on human nature and human education to the language and concepts 
of Western humanities. For instance, Mou Zongsan proposed a critical analysis 
of Kantian moral thought which led to the creation of a “moral metaphysics”, 
where we have not a metaphysics applied to morality––as in Kant––but instead a 
metaphysical investigation that in its doing provides a morality rooted in human 
nature itself. Turning Kant’s system upside-down, while the latter limited man’s 
understanding only to sensible intuition, Mou believed that man has a direct in-
tuition of reality that derives from his human nature, and that this is shared with 
the whole of Nature (i.e. with all beings). According to Mou, each man is a unique 
“through-hole” tongkong 通孔, and “through-holes” are the only ways for truth to 
reveal itself to the world. We can say that men are necessary for truth. Therefore, 
each man, being this “through-hole”, has direct access to the essence (noumenon) 
of reality or truth (dao 道). Humans have direct access to reality, and this is the 
perfect teaching of New Confucianism. Chinese philosophy is “concrete philos-
ophy” juti de zhexue 具体的哲学 searching for a concrete universal juti de pubian 
具体的普遍 truth, and not, as for Western philosophy, an abstract chouxian de 抽
象的, a truth far from human life (Mou 2009, ch. 1–2). 
According to Mou, despite the greatness of this idea, China has lost its creative 
energy since the Qing dynasty, when Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism first 
started to be despised as abstract and useless thought, and under the Commu-
nist government the complete destruction of traditional culture reached its apex 
(ibid., ch. 19). Against this attack on the Chinese soul, in 1958 Mou Zongsan, 
Tang Junyi and several other leading thinkers of New Confucianism––despite 
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this having never been a coherent school (Makeham 2003, part. I) – signed and 
diffused in the Hong Kong press their “Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Cul-
ture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World” (wei zhongguo wenhua 
jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan 为中国文化敬告世界人士宣言), a document that 
we now see as a conservative and a doomed attempt to restore Confucian thought 
against the ruse of Positivist Western thought and Communism. This declaration, 
although unfulfilled, was the first collective action of New Confucian thinkers, 
and in some ways shaped their identity. It was only with the opening of China, 
guided by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, that Chinese New Confucian think-
ers openly expressed their thoughts in mainland China and started to create a 
common identity with real affiliations among schools and subgroup branches, in 
order to find an orthodox thought and lineage. As noted by Makeham, we could 
identify at least seven characteristics shared by New Confucian thinking:
[1.] Confucianism is accepted as the orthodoxy and main pillar of Chi-
nese culture. As a branch or school within Confucianism, the New Con-
fucians place a high value on xin xing zhi xue 心性之學. […2.] New 
Confucians regard China’s historical culture as a spiritual reality (jingsh-
en shiti 精神實體) and the flow of this historical culture is where this 
spiritual reality is manifest. [… 3.] New Confucians affirm the notion 
of daotong 道統 (interconnecting thread of the way) as the basis for na-
tionhood and the source of cultural transformation. [… 4.] New Confu-
cians emphasize the need to adopt a respectful and empathetic attitude 
to China’s historical culture. [… 5.] New Confucians have a strong sense 
of “origin; roots (genyuan 根源).” […6.] New Confucians evidence a keen 
awareness of the crisis facing Chinese culture [… 7.] New Confucianism 
is rich in religious sentiment and has a strong sense of mission to rejuve-
nate Chinese culture. (Makeham 2003, 29–30) 
Obviously those seven threads are disputable, but they enrich our discussion on 
the contemporary “Chinese dream” and on the relevance of Confucian education 
to today’s China. As to the first point, for New Confucianists Confucianism is the 
core of Chinese culture, the origin or at least the most relevant actor in establish-
ing the Classics and the bases of Chinese traditional culture. Clearly, other schools 
of thought, such as Daoism, Legalism, and even Buddhism. have been relevant, 
however none of them could compete with the active shaping of society carried 
out by Confucianism, this being the leading school of thought within the Imperi-
al Court and the Imperial Hanlin Academy. The further characteristics shared by 
the New Confucians, from 3 to 6, above, have to do with the mission those think-
ers undertook, namely the protection of Confucian or Neo-Confucian thought 
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as the well-spring of Chinese tradition and culture. But two points are much 
more relevant, numbers 2 and 7, which see New Confucianism, or simply Con-
fucianism, as a religious teaching that could rejuvenate the nation. Confucianism 
is both a philosophical system and spiritual belief, which can enrich a soulless 
society. In order to understand this point, we need to look closer at what the es-
tablishment of a correct tradition meant in China. In pre-Imperial China, history 
was interpreted through a correlative scheme of five agents, 五行, and these are 
descriptive concepts that the possible configurations of qi 氣, the vital energy 
that underlies everything in the world. This correlative scheme of five elements––
wood, fire, soil, metal and water––is used to understand and define everything in 
the world, biological life as diseases, the individual psychological dispositions as 
physical characteristics, the correct form of education in human life, the seasons as 
colours, but, most relevant for us, historical events––i.e. the collapse of dynasties 
and the breaking out of wars––as social relationships (Graham 1986; Graham 
1989). Therefore, Confucianism as an interpreter of political and social life is the 
only effective way to forecast, prevent and understand events. We thus argue that 
this ability to penetrate the essence of qi, as acknowledged for Confucianism, is 
the reason for both the definition of Chinese culture as a “spiritual reality” (jingsh-
en shiti 精神实体), and the central role Confucianism must have in the “revival” 
fuxing 复兴 of this culture. We know that the term “renaissance” is the heart of the 
“Chinese dream”, and it is the core of a new education of Chinese society from its 
psychological and historical roots. 
Political Confucianism
In 1983 the Confucius Foundation was set up in Beijing with the full support of 
Deng Xiaoping and the Communist Party, and we can see this as the starting point 
of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream”. In 1989, at the 2540th anniversary of Confucius’s 
birthday, the President of the People’s Republic Jiang Zemin blessed the event, 
praised all the participants’ speeches, noted the historical relevance of Confucius as 
the father of Chinese culture, and highlighted Confucius’s teachings as a model of 
correct moral education. At this event, Gu Mu, who was Deng’s right-hand man in 
the economic modernisation program, delivered a long speech advocating the deci-
sive role of Confucianism in China’s past, present and future. He praised Confucian 
values such as harmony, wisdom, social relationships, respect for authority, and com-
plete pedagogy, as valid tools against the spiritual pollution from the West that had 
caused the Tiananmen demonstrations. From this moment forward, Confucianism 
started to be a conservative and traditional force that could be used to maintain 
authority. We quote just a few lines of this speech, as follows:
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The Chinese nation has had a long history and brilliant ancient culture. 
For a long period of time in human history, the Chinese culture, with 
Confucian school of thought as the mainstream, glittered with colour-
ful splendour […] Culture serves both as the emblem of the level of 
civilization of a nation or a country, and the guidance for its political 
and economic life. To promote prosperity and peace for a nation and for 
mankind in general, it is necessary to develop a compatible culture. In 
this regard, a proper attitude toward the traditional national culture is 
very important. (Gu 2000)
Reading these lines from Gu Mu’s 1989 speech, it is natural to find analogies with 
those of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Already in 1989 the new cultural course of 
Chinese socialism had begun. While it was not termed “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”, it was already allied with the conservative and nationalist forces 
of Chinese learned society. At this time, the Chinese Communist Party, which is 
considered a leftist force in the West, moved closer to the nationalist and conserv-
ative Confucian side, which in the West would be considered on the right side of 
the political spectrum. This is the reason for a contemporary society split in two, 
with the Communists and traditionalists on one side, and liberal, reformist and 
Westernised people on the other. 
Now we understand the relevance of a correct definition of Confucianism, since 
it became an active force in Chinese society at both the political and social levels. 
Is this Confucianism the New Confucianism we just outlined, or not? Is there 
a different kind of Confucianism in contemporary China? The answer to both 
questions is positive, since we have at least one other huge theoretical Confucian 
school that is gradually imposing its interpretation on the old teachings. This 
school is usually termed “Political Confucianism” or “Institutional Confucianism”, 
and it is headed by Jiang Qing, who in 1996 founded the Yangming Academy 阳
明精舍 in Guiyang (Guizhou), a Confucian-based academic institution that is 
defined in several websites as being devoted to ancient Chinese culture, being “the 
modern school that most aims at restoring the ancient way” (阳明精舍—最复古
的现代书院), and therefore the emblem of contemporary Confucian education. 
Jiang Qing is an open enemy of Neo-Confucian and New Confucian philoso-
phy, since he contends that the related philosophers were influenced by liberal 
democracy, and that their schools are not based on Confucian philosophy but on 
Western Kantianism and Idealism, to the point where we can find no traces of 
Confucian logic in their discourses. As everyone learned in Confucian philosophy 
since the time of Confucius should know, Confucianism is twofold, since it is 
devoted to the teaching of both external kingship (waiwang 外王), and internal 
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wisdom (neisheng 内圣). The external kingship is an effective system, with good 
ruling and political institutions that include all the Confucian rites. The internal 
wisdom refers to the interior development of the individual, who cultivates his 
moral nature, educates his heart-mind (心) and achieves the final, perfect state 
of a wise man. After Jiang, New Confucian philosophers completely neglected 
the first aim of Confucian teaching, since they devoted their attention only to 
internal cultivation, and this is the reason for calling this school of thought “Mind 
Confucianism”, which is the translation of xin xing ruxue 心性儒学, namely Con-
fucianism devoted the study of the nature of the heart-mind. Jiang Qing quotes as 
best example of this deviation Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi, who paid attention 
only to the “good life” and not “good ruling”, since they implicitly supported the 
liberal democratic society of the West. Therefore, Jiang Qing contends that the 
New Confucians proposed that Chinese people should live in a Western society, 
where their moral and internal wisdom could find a perfect fulfilment; we can say 
“(ancient) Chinese within, but Western outside”.
As Jiang Qing argues:
I think this contemporary neo-Confucian solution is mistaken because 
it treats Western democracy and science as the ultimate standard for the 
development of Chinese socio-political institutions, thus justifying the 
suspicion that it advocates a disguised version of China’s Westernization 
rather than authentically developing Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism’s 
solution attempts to derive Confucian socio-political institutions exclu-
sively from the Mind Confucianism scholarship and ignores the exist-
ence of another strand of the Confucian tradition, namely, Political Con-
fucianism, which has many resources for developing political systems. 
It is unfortunate that contemporary Neo-Confucians regard modern 
science as intrinsically valuable. Science is only instrumentally valuable. 
The Chinese can certainly learn from and adopt modern science in their 
society, but they must regulate science according to Confucian moral val-
ues. ( Jiang 2011, 24).
We see in Jiang’s words the concept underlying the already quoted four-character 
expression of the late Qing, namely “Chinese culture as essence and Western as 
function” zhong ti xi yong 中体西用. Science has to be studied and used, but the 
only standard in its use should be Confucian morality. The same goes for democ-
racy, that it should be studied but never applied to Chinese society, since, as Jiang 
explains in several essays, this political system has Western roots and is linked to 
European religions, and furthermore, it is an imperfect system that promises but 
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never really aims at achieving equality. This political system is thus unsuitable for 
China, and would destroy Chinese tradition and Confucianism. 
Jiang Qing thus prefers the Confucian lineage of Gong Yang’s (公羊) scholar-
ship that has Xunzi––an opponent of Mencius’s “good nature theory” followed by 
New Confucians––among its most ancient supporters. The Gong Yang school of 
thought was developed during the Han dynasty period (Li 2014, 243–4), and it 
was very influential. Afterwards, during the Song and Ming eras, it was neglected 
because of the power of Neo-Confucians (i.e. Mind Confucianism), and it was 
finally rescued by late Qing Confucians such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927). The 
major works of this lineage are The Book of Rites (Liji 礼记) and The Spring and 
Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋), together with the Han dynasty commentaries 
( Jiang 2011, 25). Jiang Qing even reassures New Confucians when he argues 
that both Confucian lineages have legitimacy, but that they must converge again, 
together providing a teaching of external kingship (wai wang 外王) and internal 
wisdom (nei sheng 内圣). 
Jiang Qing goes even further, proposing a modern “external kingship” or political 
system based on Confucian wisdom. He shapes a tricameral system as follows: 1. 
“The House of Profound Confucians” (tong ru yuan 通儒院), where Confucian 
learned men maintain and protect the legitimacy of the sacred way (dao 道); 2. 
“The House of National Continuity” (guoti yuan 国体院) where deep connois-
seurs of cultural heritage and tradition deliberate about ancient values; 3. “The 
House of Plebeians” (shumin yuan 庶民院), where common people’s needs and 
desires are represented ( Jiang 2013). The first chamber finds its legitimacy with 
respect for the sacred way, and thus in the spiritual or religious realm. The second 
chamber has legitimacy from Chinese tradition and ancient learning. The last 
chamber’s legitimacy lies in the common people’s will. Therefore, the sacred or 
holy, the perfect learning and the people are all represented, and each chamber 
has its duty and field of deliberation. This refined and complex tripartite structure 
reflects the ancient Chinese cosmology that combines the Sky (tian 天), Earth (di 
地) and Humanity (ren 人) in one organic body. The Sky is the normative princi-
ple that regulates everything and legitimates any change; the Earth is the produc-
tive power, the feminine womb where life puts down its roots; the Humanity is 
the higher form of life, and has in itself a regulative role being the principal actor 
with regard to stability between Sky and Earth, but Humanity is also the most 
dangerous cause of instability. 
Wang Ruichang (2011) claims that this system merges together pre-modern 
absolutism, because it imposes a State religion (i.e. Confucianism), and a kind 
of modern liberalism, because it speaks openly about people’s desires and wills 
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(in the last chamber). Therefore, according to Jiang, China needs to establish 
Confucianism as the State religion, since legitimacy, stability, correct ethics and 
spiritual cultivation would arise from this system. To critics who fear an intol-
erant society where only the belief in Confucianism would be accepted, Jiang 
replies that Confucianism has always been tolerant, and that the State religion 
would not regulate private beliefs. Anybody can thus have private religious be-
liefs, just like in Western countries, but this private belief––such as the Christian 
religion, Buddhism, etc.––should never contend for the role of the State religion 
( Jiang 2013, 170–1). The same goes for any social questions, such as that of ho-
mosexuality, that, according to Jiang, should be tolerated, while everybody has 
to respect the Confucian social system. Nothing that diverges from stability and 
legitimacy would be allowed, but private life would be respected. He even speaks 
of a possible monarch with an ancient blood lineage from Confucius, who should 
have a symbolic role, like the Thai monarch, a kind of embodiment of legitimacy, 
a cultural and spiritual guarantor.
We see in Jiang Qing’s project the clear intention to revitalise Confucianism not 
only at the popular level, namely as education, but also at the institutional one. 
While New Confucians’ Confucianism is for people living in a modern politi-
cal society, with modern––and likely desacralized and secular––institutions, Jiang 
Qing’s Confucianism aims at becoming the foundation of society itself. These 
two ways of Confucianism could not be more different, they are the separate 
sides of the already quoted “inner wisdom” (nei sheng 内圣) and “outer kingship” 
(wai wang 外王) dichotomy. It seems impossible to bridge this gap, since they are 
Confucianism’s two faces, but are they perhaps two faces of the same coin?
Conclusions 
Now the time has come to inquire which one of these two faces shall be the 
Chinese Confucianism of its future political and educations systems. More cor-
rectly: which one is more compatible with Xi Jinping’s “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”?
We think there is not an unequivocal answer to these questions. What is indis-
putable for scholars is that New Confucianism is usually interpreted as bending 
to Western liberal democracy, something hardly compatible with the Chinese po-
litical system. However, since Stephen C. Angle (2012) suggests that a perfect de-
mocracy is almost impossible, and so what is possible in Chinese society is a kind 
of “moderate perfectionism”, where the widely shared values of Confucianism are 
supported and protected by the State, but the majority of choices are set free. The 
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values the State protects are humaneness, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and 
faithfulness, and thus education. In this “moderately perfected democracy”, New 
Confucianism should establish its political party without becoming a religious 
teaching, but instead a pedagogical and spiritual asset. What Angle does not dis-
cuss is the feasibility of this project in a one-party political system, i.e. the role of 
the Communist Party. In our opinion, it is more natural that a trend within the 
Communist Party would gradually endorse Confucian values as a political project, 
and that is actually what Xi Jinping is suggesting without naming this project in 
Confucian terms.
What about Jiang Qing’s three chambers? Socialist Chinese politics are laic but 
guarantee religious freedom. In the 1982 Constitution it is stated that “The State 
protects legitimate religious activities. No one may use religion to carry out coun-
ter-revolutionary activities or activities that disrupt public order, harm the health 
of citizens or obstruct the educational systems of the state. No religious affairs 
may be dominated by any foreign country.” (Yoshiko and Wank 2009, 11). Chi-
nese Constitution does not consider a State religion or even religious education 
to be possible, i.e. Confucian schools cannot replace national education. It is more 
likely that Institutional Confucianism will gradually gain more relevance, but in 
the given spaces guaranteed by the Chinese State. As Chau clearly explains:
There are broadly speaking two strategies which people “doing religion” 
in China adopt in negotiating with the party-state to attain a higher 
degree of legitimacy. The first is “getting into the official fold”, which is 
to obtain the status of belonging to one of the five officially recognized 
religions and becoming an officially recognized “venue for religious ac-
tivities”. […] The second strategy is “creative dissimulation”, which is to 
disguise one’s religious activities as something else that is more palatable 
in official eyes. […] to get their deity worship or ritual practice recog-
nized (and accredited) by the State as “intangible cultural heritage” […] 
(Chau 2011). 
While the first strategy, to become a religious official, is suitable for Buddhism, 
Daoism, and Islam, and far from Jiang Qing’s project, it is the second which seems 
more suitable for Institutional Confucianism, and in effect he has founded an 
academy for this in Guizhou. However, even if this is the more suitable way to 
become approved as “religious thought”, this does not mean that it will become 
a “State religion”, since this would seriously interfere with the Chinese political 
status quo. We note that since the year 2000 the question of whether Confucian-
ism is a religion has provoked a harsh “religion debate” (Sun 2013, 82–93) that 
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remains unresolved, because, as we know thanks to our analysis, the concept of 
“religion” is not only a cultural label, but a relevant (conservative) political asset, 
while traditional education seems more neutral.
As we said for New Confucian, which could be partially absorbed by the Party, the 
same is true for Institutional Confucianism. More than a completely new institu-
tional configuration, a gradual alignment of some of the Party with this system is 
more likely. This political trend would represent all the three Chambers in itself, 
including experts of Confucian wisdom, traditional knowledge and the common 
people. As we have seen on reading Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s speeches, Confu-
cianism is already labelled as a national force, the deep roots of Chinese culture 
and the grounds for a Chinese future. Therefore, within the Communist Party a 
large percentage of leading politicians already share the project of the “Confu-
cianisation” of society, but this does not mean they will become “Confucians” in-
stead of “socialists”. There are even several socialist thinkers who present a natural 
convergence between Confucian and Marxist values, since both support people’s 
moral transformation and an “allocentric” attitude, as Shi Tianjian (2015) termed 
it. Moreover, Confucianism has never really been eradicated from Chinese society, 
and people are fond of Confucius’s texts, as seen in the unpredictable success of 
Yu Dan’s self-help book on the Analects, which has sold over ten millions copies 
(including six millions pirated ones), with Daniel E. Bell even suggesting a new 
wave of Confucianism in Chinese public schools and within the Central Party 
School in Beijing Bell 2010, 26, 59). However, this “wave” still does not imply 
that the Party is leaving behind its socialist soul, but rather that the socialist and 
the Confucian souls are merging together into one “Chinese soul”. Confucianism 
guarantees all the main Chinese political characteristics: a society based on social 
relationships, paternalism, moralism, strong government control, limited political 
dissent, social harmony and so on.
Therefore, we suggest that both forms of Confucianism are suitable in the con-
struction of China’s internal and global identity. Internally, Jiang Qing’s political 
thought would provide a strong validation for an authoritarian and stable sys-
tem, where the wealth of the society as a whole is always more relevant than the 
wealth of its individuals. Clearly, harmony (he 和) often means the flattening of 
creativity, as seen in the recent suppression of artistic freedom (Breacher 2014) 
and censorship (Sala 2016) demonstrate. Xi Jinping is worried by any alternative 
to his “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, and critics are perceived as devi-
ant actors with political motives. Suggesting a long-lasting tradition of Political 
Confucianism that allows limited freedom, Jiang Qing provides a cultural and 
identitary reason for this authoritarian system. This is why any Western claim for 
freedom or form of protest––within or outside China––would first be marked as 
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a cultural offence. We believe that China has the right to protect its culture and 
social system against foreign arrogance, but that does not mean that this culture 
should prevent any form of dissent, as dissent has always been a key part of Chi-
nese cultural, literacy and political tradition, such as Confucius leaving his official 
position, as well as the actions of Qu Yuan, Su Shi and many other relevant think-
ers in different epochs of Chinese history. 
On the other hand, the New Confucian theories of inner cultivation and moral 
behaviour make a great contribution to the education of a rapidly modernising 
society in search of identity. The contradictory results of the first survey we quot-
ed in chapter 2 may be interpreted as being in accord with this form of Confu-
cianism. In our opinion, the strong rejection of the usefulness of Confucianism 
in modern society proves the respondents’ suspicions concerning applying this 
tradition to contemporary political thought, since they see Confucian institutions 
as oppressive. However, this rejection does not concern Confucianism as a way of 
perfection or as wisdom, since the same respondents acknowledge the relevance of 
the Confucian classics, Confucian moral values, Chinese education, and Chinese 
medicine in the shaping of Chinese identity. This means that, according to this 
survey and the others we quoted, Chinese society is largely compatible with New 
Confucianism, but less so with Institutional Confucianism. We thus suggest that 
the Chinese political system is likely far more attracted by a strong authoritari-
an Confucian identity, while Chinese modern society––mostly in the big coastal 
cities––would at the most accept the New Confucian form, which belongs to in-
dividuals and does not determine the shape of society. We propose the following 
image: Political Confucianism demands Confucianism to be the body of Chinese 
society, while New Confucian teaching is mostly devoted to the establishing of a 
renovated Chinese soul. Apparently, the “Chinese dream” of recent years is closer 
to the New Confucian project, and does not envisage a Confucianisation of so-
ciety, but the authoritarian appeal of Institutional Confucianism would probably 
gain consent within the Party. 
China is looking at the economically developed states at its borders, such as Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and so on. All these nations are examples of a combination 
of Western economic development, moderate freedom, traditional nationalism, 
traditional and modern education systems, and overall mixed societies that include 
both Confucian aspects (i.e. filial piety in family relations) and Westernised ways 
of life. China sees a Confucianisation of its internal and global identity as the 
chance to really become a peer with the most developed Asian countries, Euro-
pean countries, and the USA, rather than just the “world’s low-quality factory”. 
If “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is defined in Confucian forms, China 
would be able to place itself completely outside the remaining Cold War “two 
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power blocks” system, which necessarily places China on the side of Russia, North 
Korea, and so on. This “Confucian Socialism” would allow China to create a new 
globalised identity, and this plan is evident if we look at the “one road, one belt” (yi 
lu yi dai 一路一带) project, which places China at the source of a new globalised 
region that covers all of the Eurasian––or even Afro-Eurasian––continent. In the 
enduring Russia-USA competition, Confucianism is a neutral identity that allows 
China to maintain a certain impartiality. Moreover, this “cultural soft power” finds 
a telling instance in the creation of Confucius Institutes around the world, which 
are warmly welcomed in impoverished departments of humanities and actually 
provide an extraordinary contribution to Chinese language learning and cultural 
knowledge, but, at the same time, are often accused of limiting research freedom 
in these foreign universities (Sahlins 2015). What is really interesting is that these 
institutes rarely organise any conferences devoted to Communist or socialist theo-
ries, but instead focus on the Chinese language and traditional culture, since this is 
China’s new international image, as part of the new “China’s charm offensive”, as 
Kurlantzick (2007) and Hartig (2015) termed it. What China wants, is to compete 
not only at the economic and political levels, but also to be as culturally attractive 
as Japan, since China is the source of several aspects of Japanese culture that are be-
loved worldwide, and are the main asset of Japan’s soft power (Vyas 2011, 59–62). 
Japan was the first Asian country to use cultural NGOs (i.e. Japan Foundations that 
belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Japan-China Friendship Associations) 
as instruments of cultural soft power (ibid., 152–9), and Confucius Institutes are 
evidence that China has learned from this approach. China’s efforts here have been 
so effective that recently two American senators proposed the “Countering Infor-
mation Warfare Act 2016 (S.2692)” against Chinese and Russian media (Portman 
and Murphy 2016), in order to control the circulation of information from these 
two countries thanks to worldwide channels as RT, Sputnik, PLA Daily, CCTV, 
and so (Chu 2016). Another instance of this “charm offensive” is the growing in-
terest in buying European football teams and increasing investment in any kind 
of sport, since sport is a good way to create a new image of Chinese abroad. We 
should perhaps ask ourselves why Japanese or American soft power does not cause 
as much irritation to European countries as Chinese soft power does. 
As a final instance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” (zhongguo meng 中国梦) com-
munication strategy, we want to mention the Chinese message to the world at Expo 
2015 in Milan. China’s Pavilion, the first one set up overseas, focused the visitors’ 
attention on the ground floor on traditional culture (i.e. the threefold cosmology we 
discussed earlier), and on spectacular Yunnan rice fields created with multicoloured, 
tubular LED bulbs. On the first floor, there was a small theatre, where a fascinating 
traditional Yunnan dance was performed. Before the dance, president Xi Jinping 
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welcomed visitors by presenting the brilliance of ancient China’s agricultural civili-
sation, and the richness of the country’s cuisine, as well as contemporary scientific 
and technological developments in food production. He closed his short speech by 
saying “We look forward to exchanges of agricultural expertise with all other coun-
tries to jointly ensure food security in the world and advance human civilization” (Xi 
2015). The advance of human civilisation needs China, and China needs its ancient 
past, and only within this circular process will future progress be possible. That is the 
fuxing, the retrospection or return to tradition in order to have a harmonious (he) fu-
ture. After the President’s welcome, the visitors could watch a nine-minute cartoon 
about the celebration of the New Year Lantern Festival in a traditional rural family, 
when the three––yes, we said three––grown up and successful children (a chemist, 
musician and cook) go back home and express their love for their grandparents and 
parents. Only the cook cannot go back home, but he greets the family thanks to a 
video call (see link to the video at the end of Bibliographic references). This idyllic 
and bucolic scene is the new image China wishes to diffuse abroad and within the 
country. Loving children who follow the Confucian principle of filial piety (xiao 
孝), family affection as the basis for any social relationship (i.e. allocentrism), and 
ancient Chinese festivals, which represent a continued connection with tradition 
(fuxing). However, at the same time the three grown up children are modern and 
successful people. They represent science and technology, culture and arts, and final-
ly the Chinese culture of the body (traditional medicine and food). According to 
this image, Confucian moral and cultural education is fully compatible with West-
ernized education and culture. It is no more the zhong ti xi yong 中体西用, since 
both structural (ti 体) and functional (yong 用) sides are a harmonious composition 
of China zhong 中 and West xi 西. This cartoon testifies that Confucianism is not 
a temporary wave, but rather the new Chinese course, the “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” (zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi 中国特色社会主义), between tradition 
and modernity, a path still far from complete achievement. 
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